Part 1 — Power Failure
When Fire Arrives, the Power Goes With It
Fire doesn't just threaten your home — it destroys the infrastructure your home depends on. Power lines burn. Substations fail. Pumping stations go offline. The same electrical grid that you'd rely on to run a defense system is often the first casualty of the fire it's supposed to help fight. In the Sierra foothills, this isn't a theoretical risk. It has happened in every major fire on record.
Historically, electric utility infrastructure has been responsible for less than 10% of reported wildfires. However, wildfires attributed to electrical infrastructure consist of roughly half of the most destructive wildfires in California history.
California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC)
cpuc.ca.gov/psps
The relationship is self-reinforcing: power lines start fires, and fires destroy power lines. Either way, the grid goes down — and it goes down at the worst possible moment. When power fails during a fire event, so does every system that depends on it: water pumps, charging stations, communications equipment, and any wildfire defense system without its own independent power source.
California Fires That Destroyed Power Infrastructure
Camp Fire — Paradise, CA (2018)
PG&E power line failures caused the fire that killed 85 people and destroyed 11,000+ structures. Within minutes of ignition, the fire overtook Paradise so rapidly that residents had no warning — and no power. The same infrastructure that started the fire was the first thing it consumed. The entire power grid serving Paradise was destroyed before most residents knew a fire had started.
Caldor Fire — El Dorado County (2021)
The Caldor Fire destroyed power infrastructure throughout Grizzly Flats and simultaneously damaged three flumes forming part of the El Dorado Irrigation District's water conveyance system. Power and water failed together — illustrating how intertwined these systems are, and how losing one cascades into losing both. The community had no power and no water at the same time.
Rim Fire (2013) — Hetch Hetchy Power & Water
A single fire took out both power generation and water conveyance simultaneously — damaging facilities at Hetch Hetchy Reservoir, Cherry Reservoir, and Lake Eleanor, including the Lower Cherry Aqueduct and the Holm Powerhouse. This is the critical risk pattern: California's mountain infrastructure is so interconnected that one fire can shut down power for cities hundreds of miles away.
Bear Fire (2020) & Carr Fire (2018)
Both fires required precautionary evacuation of DWR and Bureau of Reclamation hydropower plant operators — taking California hydroelectric generation offline mid-event. When hydropower goes offline during a fire, other grid sources face higher demand precisely when they're least able to deliver, creating rolling failures across the broader network.
North Bay Fires — Santa Rosa (2017)
Power infrastructure failed so rapidly and completely that emergency alert systems — which rely on the same grid — couldn't reach residents in time. Neighbors had to physically drive through burning neighborhoods honking car horns and banging on doors to warn people. The fires killed 44 people and destroyed nearly 9,000 homes and structures. The state's emergency manager testified that they "lacked authority" to force utility companies to make infrastructure more resilient.
Klamathon Fire — Siskiyou County (2018)
Fire destroyed the main water storage tank serving Hornbrook, CA — leaving the community without water for two full months. But the root cause was interconnected with power: municipal water pumping systems require electricity to maintain pressure, and when power fails, stored water can't be distributed. The Klamathon Fire demonstrated both failures simultaneously.
Power failure also prevents your protection from activating
A wildfire defense system that depends on grid power faces a compounding problem: the most dangerous fire conditions — high winds, low humidity, dry vegetation — are the same conditions that trigger Public Safety Power Shutoffs (PSPS). PG&E has cut power to millions of Sierra foothills customers during fire weather events, sometimes for up to 6.8 days at a time. A system with no independent power source may be offline before the fire even starts — disabled by the same conditions it was built to protect against.
Part 2 — Water Failure
Municipal Water Fails Every Time
Water pressure failure during large wildfire events is not an anomaly — it is a predictable, structural consequence of how municipal water systems are designed. According to a state analysis, hydrant failures during the 2025 Palisades Fire were "the rule rather than the exception." The same pattern has repeated across every major California WUI fire on record.
It happens pretty quickly in almost any wildfire in most contexts, but especially one like this. Urban water systems are typically designed to have 25% to 40% more water than needed to prepare for homes that catch on fire — not block after block of an entire neighborhood, with everything burning at once.
Greg Pierce, Director — UCLA Water Resources Group
High Country News, January 2025
Every one of those homes that gets burned is an open sore to the outside. Your system basically is dying as every one of those homes are being destroyed.
Water District Official, quoted in CalMatters analysis of Palisades Fire hydrant failures
CalMatters, December 2025
The Eaton and the Palisades fires really drew a lot of attention to the capabilities of water for fire suppression. Yet we experienced in the Camp Fire, the Valley Fire, the Carr Fire — all of these fires have exceeded municipalities' ability to provide water for fire suppression.
William Sapeta, Fire Chief — Lake County Fire Protection District
CalMatters, December 2025
A Pattern Repeated Across Every Major California Fire
1991
Oakland Hills Fire
Water pressure failures hampered firefighting as multiple hydrants ran dry. 3,000+ homes destroyed. One of the earliest documented cases of catastrophic municipal water failure during a major California WUI fire.
2017
Tubbs Fire — Santa Rosa, CA
Caused extensive and then-unprecedented damage to the City of Santa Rosa's water distribution system in the Fountaingrove neighborhood. Benzene contamination was discovered in the municipal water supply — the first known case of widespread organic chemical contamination in a water distribution system after a wildfire. Miles of pipes required repair or replacement.
2017
Ventura County Fires
Hydrant outages and water pressure failures documented. Similar failures repeated in a second Ventura County fire in 2018 — both burning more than 1,000 homes each.
2018
Camp Fire — Paradise, CA (Butte County)
The Paradise Irrigation District had to shut off water at every single meter in town. Benzene and other volatile organic compounds (VOCs) contaminated the distribution system after burned plastic pipes created a vacuum that sucked toxic compounds into the water supply. The Do Not Drink advisory remained in place until May 2020 — 18 months after the fire. Miles of pipe were ultimately replaced.
2018
Klamathon Fire — Siskiyou County, CA
The main storage tank serving the community of Hornbrook was destroyed. The community was left without water for two full months while infrastructure was rebuilt.
2021
Caldor Fire — Grizzly Flats, El Dorado County
Parts of the Grizzly Flats water distribution system and storage tanks were destroyed. Three flumes forming part of the El Dorado Irrigation District's conveyance system were also damaged — cutting water delivery across a broader area.
2025
Palisades Fire — Los Angeles, CA
Three 1-million-gallon elevated tanks ran dry in sequence — the first at 4:45 p.m., the second at 8:30 p.m., and the third at 3 a.m. the following morning. Water demand hit 4× normal rates for 15 straight hours. A state analysis concluded hydrant failures were "the rule rather than the exception." Governor Newsom ordered an independent investigation. Residents of Pacific Palisades, Altadena, and parts of Pasadena were told not to drink tap water due to ash, soot, and chemical contamination.
Water contamination: a second threat even after the fire
Even when municipal water physically remains available during a fire event, it may be unsafe to use. The Tubbs Fire (2017) and Camp Fire (2018) both caused widespread benzene and VOC contamination of distribution systems — not just the source water. When homes burn, damaged plastic pipes create pressure vacuums that pull toxic compounds into the municipal supply, potentially contaminating homes that didn't burn. This is why water-use advisories can persist for months or years after a fire event. A standalone, dedicated water tank used exclusively by your Drench system avoids this risk entirely.
Part 3 — Connectivity Failure
Cell Towers and Internet Go Down Too
Power outages don't just cut your lights — they silence your communications. During California's major wildfire and PSPS events, cell towers, landline internet, and broadband services have failed at scale, leaving residents unable to call 911, receive emergency alerts, or remotely control their systems. A wildfire defense system that relies on a standard internet connection may lose its link to you at the exact moment you need it most.
Why cell towers fail during wildfire events
Most cell towers have only 4–8 hours of battery backup. Many have generators, but generators can't be safely deployed or refueled in all locations — particularly in the steep, remote terrain common throughout the Sierra foothills. When a PSPS cuts grid power, towers that exhaust their backup power go dark. When fire itself burns through an area, towers burn with everything else. There are no federal or state regulations that mandate cell carriers maintain any minimum backup power at individual tower sites.
Kincade Fire PSPS — October 2019
874 cell towers went offline during the October 27 PSPS event — including more than 57% of all cell sites in Marin County alone. A California Public Utilities Commission report found 85,000 wireless customers and 160,000 wired customers lost service during the 2017 North Bay Fires. People who depended solely on cellphones couldn't call 911 or receive emergency notifications.
2019 PSPS — Sierra Foothills & Bay Area
Sonoma, Lake, Santa Cruz, Humboldt, and Calaveras counties all saw more than 20% of cell towers go offline. Napa County lost 19% of towers. San Mateo and Contra Costa counties saw more than 11% of towers fail. Landline customers who rely on broadband-based phone service lost connectivity even with charged phones and battery backups — because the infrastructure feeding those services had no power.
North Bay Fires — Santa Rosa (2017)
Cell towers and communications lines burned with the fire, going silent as the fire spread. In the Coffey Park neighborhood, residents received no warnings before their homes were destroyed. Sonoma County dispatchers reported being "flooded with calls" before communications collapsed entirely. Emergency responders had to drive neighborhoods with sirens and PA systems — or go house to house on foot — to warn residents.
National Scale — 85 Million Americans at Risk
A University of Wisconsin–Madison study found that approximately 1 in 4 Americans lives in an area served by cell towers at risk of wildfire-caused outage. More than 430,000 cell network transceivers covering approximately 85 million people are located in areas the U.S. Forest Service classifies as moderate or high wildfire risk.
Getting backup power for all communications services is "infeasible" or "impossible" during extended power outages. Companies said most sites have batteries or generators, but they could last anywhere from two hours to a week — and many said it was logistically impossible or unsafe to deploy or refuel gas generators.
Telecommunications companies, in filings to the California Public Utilities Commission
GovTech, October 2019
There are no federal or state regulations that mandate cell carriers have any backup power for cell service. What this tells us is that the communications network is vulnerable. It's not resilient. The companies were not prepared. And requirements must be put in place to require backup power.
Ana Maria Johnson, Program Manager — Public Advocates Office, California Public Utilities Commission
GovTech
The failure of cellphone and other privately owned systems crippled emergency-warning efforts during California's deadly October wildfires, and the state lacks authority to order those companies to strengthen their systems against disasters.
Mark Ghilarducci, Director — California Office of Emergency Services
California Legislative Hearing, December 2017
Why Drench uses Starlink, not standard internet
Standard broadband and cellular internet connections share the same vulnerability: they depend on local infrastructure — fiber lines, cable lines, cell towers — that goes dark when power fails or burns. Starlink is a low-Earth orbit satellite network that operates completely independently of ground-based infrastructure. Because each Drench system has its own battery-backed Starlink terminal, it maintains a direct satellite uplink even when every cell tower within 50 miles has failed. You can monitor your system, receive status alerts, and control activation from anywhere — even as local infrastructure collapses around your property.
The Drench Approach
Why Drench Is Designed to Be Independent
The evidence is consistent across decades of California fire history: utility power, municipal water, and standard internet connections all fail during major wildfire events — often simultaneously. Drench is engineered from the ground up with this reality in mind — every component of the system is designed to operate without any dependency on the utility grid, municipal water supply, or ground-based internet infrastructure.
Off-Grid Power + Standalone Water
Every Drench system includes both independent power and independent water — so protection continues regardless of what happens to the grid or municipal supply.
400W Solar Array
Charges the battery bank during daylight hours. Sized to maintain full system readiness throughout fire season without any grid input.
LiFePO4 Battery Bank
Powers the pump, controls, and foam delivery system for 4–4.5 hours of continuous operation. Instantly takes over the moment grid power fails — no gap, no switching delay.
Dedicated Water Tank
Standard systems: 2,500 gallons. Extra-large: 5,000 gallons. Your water is stored on-site, isolated from the municipal supply, and immune to pressure failure, contamination, and infrastructure damage.
Starlink Satellite Communication
Drench communicates via Starlink — not local cell towers that go down in fire events. Your system stays reachable and continues sending status updates even when local infrastructure has failed entirely.
Your Home Shouldn't Depend on a Grid That Fails
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